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Acts of interference against chemical facilities or chemical clusters might result in severe consequences in 
case of a successful attack (major explosions, fires, toxic dispersions or environmental contamination). 
Although process facilities implement multiple safety barriers to control process hazards that may result in 
major accidents and plants are mostly well equipped from a safety point of view, the security attention and 
resources dedicated to the protection of assets against external adversaries are not at all at the same level. 
The lack of a consolidated practice in the risk-informed implementation of security countermeasures goes 
hand in hand with the existence of very few systematic procedures for the quantitative performance evaluation 
of security systems, particularly physical protection systems (PPSs). Therefore, it is crucial to develop a 
methodology aimed at supporting the assessment of industrial facilities vulnerability to external attacks. 
The present contribution addresses the vulnerability assessment using a probabilistic risk analysis approach, 
supported by a model based on Bayesian Networks (BN). The proposed methodology includes the 
quantitative performance assessment of the protection systems, intended as both physical protection systems 
adopted as security countermeasures and safety barriers, in interfering with the progress of a potential attack. 
A case study is analyzed to exemplify the methodology application.  
1. Introduction 
Deliberate attacks to chemical facilities and clusters processing large amounts of hazardous chemicals might 
lead to high impact explosion, fire, toxic dispersion or environmental contamination scenarios (Lou et al., 
2003), ultimately resulting in a large number of public fatalities and loss of public confidence (Baybutt and 
Reddy, 2003). Nonetheless, acts of interference started to be included in the formal risk assessment of 
chemical industries only after the 9/11 attacks in New York City (Bajpai and Gupta, 2005). In Europe, although 
directives have been enacted to regulate the prioritization of measures to prevent and respond to terrorist 
attacks involving Critical Infrastructures (European Commission, 2008) and to guide the enhancement of the 
security of ship and port facilities used in international trade (European Commission, 2004), no guidelines are 
yet available for the security of chemical and process plants. 
Two recent attacks perpetrated in France in 2015, against a chemical and a petrochemical plant, dramatically 
confirmed that the security of sites where relevant quantities of hazardous chemicals are stored or processed 
must be treated as a major concern. Actually, these events showed that industry must address with the 
greatest urgency the need of increasing the level of security attention and of adopting objective, performance-
based methods to verify the adequateness of the resources dedicated to the protection of assets against 
external attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a structured methodology to assess the vulnerability of 
industrial facilities and clusters (especially those operating in the chemical sector) to external attacks and to 
identify weak links.  
Early work on assessing the risk of terrorist acts targeting industrial facilities started after 9/11, with the 
development of the so-called Security Vulnerability Assessment methods in the USA (see for example Center 
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for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 2003) and American Petroleum Institute (API, 2003) methodologies) as 
well as in Europe (Störfallkommission (SFK), 2002). Contributions available in the open literature are mostly 
qualitative, while Bajpai and Gupta proposed semi-quantitative methodologies for application to the O&G 
(Bajpai and Gupta, 2007a) and chemical sector (Bajpai and Gupta, 2007b). More recently, Reniers et al. 
(2015) developed a security protection model for the use in the process industries in Belgium. 
Other recent contributions were devoted to the analysis of specific aspects of security risks: Argenti et al. 
(2015) proposed a semi-quantitative methodology to the attractiveness assessment of chemical facilities; 
Salzano et al. (2014) investigated the potential of deliberate attacks carried out with home-made explosives to 
trigger domino effects within process plants. 
The present work specifically focuses on outsiders’ attacks involving high-consequence loss physical assets 
within the target facility, whose direct damage may lead to the release of hazardous substances. As element 
of novelty, it adopts a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) approach, supported by a model based on Bayesian 
networks, to address vulnerability assessment quantitatively through the functional analysis of Physical 
Protection Systems (PPSs) applied to secure process and storage installations. 
2. Evaluation of the likelihood contribution to security risk 
In case of security risk assessment, risk is usually analysed by using consequences, threats, target 
attractiveness and vulnerabilities in some combination. Herein, the set of risk variables proposed by the API 
SRA Methodology (API, 2013) and given in Eq. (1) was adopted as reference, then a probabilistic approach 
was proposed to characterize the likelihood contributions to security risk and a BN-based model was used to 
model the relevant influences (not only causal relations). 
CLLR ××= 21    (1) 
Although Eq. (1) does not explicitly show the conditional dependencies linking the variables, it expresses the 
concept that the probability that a given act will result in a given consequence (C) can be estimated as the 
product of the marginal probability of the threat that the attack against the asset is attempted (i.e., L1, which in 
turn depends on the threat agents’ intent and capabilities and on target attractiveness) times the conditional 
probability of successful execution of the attack given the attack attempt (i.e., L2). 
The conditions upon which a deliberate attack aiming at directly impacting process equipment is successful 
are: i) adversaries choose an installation or piece of equipment as target to attack, and ii) the security system 
protecting the installation is not effective in preventing the accomplishment of the attack. Herein, the 
effectiveness of PPSs has to be intended as overall performance variable, to be derived through a specific 
assessment of the system as a whole with respect to its design protection functions, as detailed in Section 4. 
Different attack modes, selected within the set presented in (SFK, 2002) as those capable of causing a direct 
damage to the affected equipment, were adopted to describe in a more detailed, though simplified, manner 
the attack scenarios that may be foreseen; this allowed a deeper analysis of the credibility of each scenario. 
According to Norman (2010), adversaries plan to attack according to a certain attack mode, which depends, 
on one hand, on the type of equipment selected as target and, on the other hand, on adversaries’ motivations, 
available weapons, tools and knowledge of tactics. The latter aspects may vary a lot from case to case; since 
it is beyond to the purpose of our study to devote efforts to a full characterization of threat actors, we assume 
that these aspects, and their variation, can be summarized in the definition of “threat actors categories” ( i.e. 
criminals, terrorists, activists etc.), according to the approach suggested in (SFK, 2002). 
The above-mentioned considerations were taken into account to build the qualitative structure of the Bayesian 
Network shown in Figure 1.  
A Bayesian Network is a graphical method for reasoning under uncertainty (Jensen, 1996); it was selected as 
modelling tool as it permits to merge knowledge of diverse natures in one model: data from feedback 
experience, experts’ judgment (expressed through logical rules, equations or subjective probabilities) and 
observations (Weber et al., 2012). 
The proposed network, once quantified according to the approaches presented in Section 3 and Section 4, 
allowed the evaluation of probability values that represent the quantitative expression of the likelihood 
contribution to security risk of the analyzed set of attack scenarios. Each attack scenario is represented by 
one of the possible combinations of the states of nodes N.1, N.2 and N.3; in other words, it is defined by a 
triplet: attack mode, threat agent category, and target equipment type. 
Clearly enough, the qualitative structure of the BN has generalized validity; conversely, the quantification of 
the network has to be carried out considering the specific location and features of the industrial facility under 
analysis and may involve the choice of ruling out some attack scenarios as not applicable and considering a 
reduced number of node states. 
 
692
  
Figure 1: Bayesian network for the estimation of the likelihood contribution to security risk  
3. Evaluation of the likelihood of attack 
The likelihood of an attack was characterized through the quantification of the Conditional Probability Tables 
(CPTs) of node N.3 and its parent nodes (N.1 and N.2 in Figure 1). 
The marginal probability of the threat being posed by the three categories listed as the possible states of node 
N.1 can be derived from statistical data on criminal and terroristic activities prepared by law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. 
The marginal probability of a specific type of equipment being selected as target was attributed on the basis of 
the equipment attractiveness level. The attractiveness level of different types of process equipment was 
attributed according to the taxonomy and qualitative evaluation proposed by Sabatini et al. (2009); a 
probability value was then associated to each qualitative level of attractiveness following the guidelines 
provided in (API, 2013), as summarized in Table 1. Finally, the marginal probability of each equipment type 
being selected as target was calculated through a normalization to 1 with respect to the sum of probability 
values associated to all equipment types present at the facility under analysis. 
The conditional probability values to be applied to quantify the CPT of node N.3 in Figure 1 can be determined 
through expert judgment to represent the credibility of each attack mode being chosen as preferred strategy 
given the threat actors’ category and the type of target equipment. 
Adversary attack 
success: 
adversaries’ path 
and task 
completed, target 
equipment reached
Adversary attack 
stopped
S.8.1
S.8.2
Deliberate 
misoperation
Interference using 
simple aids
Interference using 
major aids
Arson
Use of explosives
Shooting
Vehicle impact
S.3.1
S.3.2
S.3.3
S.3.4
S.3.5
S.3.6
S.3.7
Individuals or small 
groups moved by 
contingent intent, low to 
average criminal energy, 
simple tools
Small network of activists 
or members of organized 
crime, above average 
criminal energy, simple 
and specialized tools
Network of extremists and 
terrorists members, 
extremely great criminal 
energy, heavy tools and 
weapons
S.1.1
S.1.2
S.1.3
The intervention of 
PPS allows to stop 
adversaries
PPS fails to intervene 
or is not effective in 
stopping the 
adversaries
S.4.1
S.4.2
Successful 
timely 
intervention of 
response force
Delayed and 
ineffective 
intervention of 
response force
S.7.1
S.7.2
Successful 
detection and 
assessment of 
intrusion attempt
No detection and 
assessment of 
intrusion attempt
S.5.1
S.5.2
Successful timely 
intervention of response 
force
Delayed and ineffective 
intervention of response 
force
S.6.1
S.6.2
THREAT 
AGENT  
CATEGORY
N.1
TARGET 
EQUIPMENTN.2
ATTACK 
ATTEMPT
N.3
SECURITY SYSTEM 
INTERVENTIONN.4
ATTACK 
SUCCESSN.8
ASSESSED 
DETECTIONN.5
COMMUNICATION 
TO RESPONSE 
FORCE
N.6
TIMING OF 
RESPONSE 
FORCE
N.7
Liquid tanks
Criogenic tanks
Gas tanks
Low vapour pressure 
liquid tanks
Liquified gas (high P) 
tank
Liquid pipeline
Criogenic pipeline
Gas pipeline
Low vapour pressure 
liquid pipeline
Liquified gas (high P) 
pipeline
Column-type equip 
liquids
Column-type equip 
criogenic liquids
Column-type equip gas 
Column-type equip low 
vapour pressure liquid 
S.2.1
S.2.2
S.2.3
S.2.4
S.2.5
S.2.6
S.2.7
S.2.8
S.2.9
S.2.10
S.2.11
S.2.12
S.2.13
S.2.14
Column-type equip 
liquefied gas
Reactors/Heat-
exchangers liquids
Reactors/Heat-
exchangers criogenic
liquids gas 
Reactors/Heat-
exchangers gas
Reactors/Heat-
exchangers low vapour
pressure liquid 
Reactors/Heat-
exchangers liquified gas
S.2.15
S.2.16
S.2.17
S.2.18
S.2.19
S.2.20
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Table 1:  Probabilistic attractiveness assessment to support the characterization of the conditional probability 
table for node N.2 (see Figure 1). PLG = pressurized liquefied gas 
Node 
State State Description 
Qualitative 
attractiveness level 
Attractiveness-based 
probability estimate 
S.2.1 Tanks for liquid storage Very high 0.9 
S.2.2 Tanks for cryogenic storage High 0.7 
S.2.3 Tanks for gas storage  High 0.7 
S.2.4 Tanks for low vapour pressure liquid storage Medium 0.5 
S.2.5 Tanks for liquefied pressurized gas storage Low 0.3 
S.2.6 Large diameter pipelines (liquids)  Very high 0.9 
S.2.7 Large diameter pipelines (cryogenic liquids) High 0.7 
S.2.8 Large diameter pipelines (gases) Medium 0.5 
S.2.9 Large diameter pipelines (volatile liquids) Medium 0.5 
S.2.10 Large diameter pipelines (PLG) Low 0.3 
S.2.11 Column-type equipment processing liquids  High 0.7 
S.2.12 Column-type equipment processing cryogenic 
liquids 
Medium 0.5 
S.2.13 Column-type equipment processing gases  Medium 0.5 
S.2.14 Column-type equipment processing low vapour 
pressure liquids 
Medium 0.5 
S.2.15 Column-type equipment processing PLG Low 0.3 
S.2.16 Reactors/ heat-exchangers processing liquids  High 0.7 
S.2.17 Column-type equipment processing cryogenic 
liquids  
Medium 0.5 
S.2.18 Reactors/ heat-exchangers processing gases  Low 0.3 
S.2.19 Reactors/ heat-exchangers processing low 
vapour pressure liquids 
Low 0.3 
S.2.20 Reactors/ heat-exchangers processing PLG Low 0.3 
4. Evaluation of the likelihood of attack success through the assessment of Physical 
Protection Systems 
The proposed approach evaluates the probability of attack success as the complement to 1 of the probability 
of the physical protection system being effective against the attack. In the present study, the considered 
assets potentially targeted are process and storage equipment; hence, the relevant security countermeasures 
against an attack are mainly Physical Protection Systems (PPSs). The primary functions for which PPSs are 
designed are (Garcia, 2008): i) detection, which is the discovery of an adversary action followed by an alarm 
notification and proper alarm assessment ; ii) delay, which is the slowing down of adversary progress; and iii) 
response, which consists of the action taken by the response force to prevent adversary success. For the PPS 
to be effective, all the three functions must be performed in the given order: in other words, the overall system 
is effective if timely interruption of attacker’s path of actions occurs (Garcia, 2006). 
The metric used in the Sandia model (Garcia, 2006) was adopted to define overall performance variables that 
characterize the effectiveness of the functional sub-systems of PPS in terms of probability and the probability 
of attack success (PAS) was calculated according to Eq. (2): 
)(1 TRCADAS PPPP ××−=    (2) 
where PAD is the probability of assessed detection, which is calculated according to Eq. (3) as a cumulative 
probability, if i independent Ring of Protections where detection can occur are in place; PC is the probability of 
effective communication to response force; PTR is the probability of having a timely intervention of the 
response force, which is calculated according to Eq. (4) assuming normal distributions for time parameters 
characterizing the response force intervention and adversary’s tasks duration, where TDi = time duration of 
task i, and RFT= response force intervention time:  
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The so defined overall performance variables are those applied in the quantitative characterization of the 
nodes N.5, N.6, N.7 in Figure 1. Prior to apply Eqs. (2-4), path analysis has to be conducted to identify the 
possible paths that adversaries may use to enter the site and reach the selected target equipment and the 
PPS elements present along each of those paths. It should be noted that the use of Eq. (2) implies that, in 
order to successfully execute the attack, the adversary has to devote efforts to entering the site and going in 
close proximity of the target. This formulation matches well with the types of PPS and protections functions 
implemented in industrial sites; however, it is not applicable to the analysis of attack scenarios that involve the 
use of remotely controlled or long distance heavy weapons or other technologically sophisticated tools (e.g. 
RPG, drones). 
5. Illustrative case study  
In order to exemplify the application of the proposed approach to an industrial facility, a petroleum product 
terminal was considered. The scheme of the facility layout is given in Figure 2. The available PPSs consist in: 
i) a single line rigid fence with outriggers along the perimeter; ii) Access control based on shipment schedules, 
preannouncement of visitors and use of credentials (ID badges); iii) video motion detection system based the 
use of cameras mounted along the fence line, integrated with a display and control system that allows the 
remote assessment of an intrusion alarm by the security guard at the security post; iv) radio communication 
among security guards and to local law enforcement agencies with backup communication means; v) direct 
intervention of security guards working on site only in case of evidence of unarmed intruders. 
For the sake of brevity, the numerical results obtained for an attack carried out by a terrorist acting alone 
(assimilated to a threat agent of category 2) through the path indicated by the dashed arrow in Figure 2 are 
reported in Table 2. The presented results were derived by quantifying the BN shown in Figure 1 through 
HUGIN ExpertTM Software version 8.1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Simplified layout of the petroleum product terminal considered for the illustrative case study 
Table 2:  Prior probabilities for the illustrative case study 
Node State Prior probability Notes 
Threat agent category S.1.1, S.1.3 0 Assumed scenario S.1.2 1 Assumed scenario 
Target equipment S.2.1 1 From facility characterization S.2.2 to S.2.20 0 From facility characterization 
Attack attempt S.3.4 1 Assumed scenario S.3.1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 0 Assumed scenario 
Security system intervention Success 0.059 Calculated Failure 0.941 Calculated 
Assessed Detection Success 0.900 Data from (Garcia, 2008) Failure 0.100 Calculated 
Communication to response force Success 0.950 Data from (Garcia, 2008) Failure 0.050 Calculated 
Timing of response force 
Success 0.069 Calculated according to Eq. (4), task time data from (Garcia, 2008) 
Failure 0.931 Calculated 
Attack success True 0.941 Calculated False 0.059 Calculated 
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The obtained prior probabilities (see Table 2) show that the effectiveness of physical security systems in 
stopping the execution of an attack is low if not questionable (probability of success equal to 0.059). This is 
due to the fact that multiple security functions have to be executed in a timely manner in order to interrupt the 
adversary chain of actions, which requires few minutes to be completed. A worsening factor in the analyzed 
case study, which is however representative of real installations, is the absence of multiple detection and 
assessment elements (only a single ring of protection is in place) to defend outdoor process equipment that 
may actually represent an attractive target. 
6. Conclusions 
The evaluation of the likelihood contribution to security risk through a probabilistic approach has been 
discussed and exemplified. A BN-based model has been developed to support the assessment through the 
integration of quantitative statistical and performance data with probability estimates from expert elicitation.  
The analysis of the case study evidenced that only a low level of protection against intentionally induced 
losses can be obtained if the “Defence in Depth” principle (IAEA, 1996) is not applied in the design of physical 
security elements. In fact, a highly effective countermeasure deploys concentric rings of protection to defend 
critical targets, where each ring represents an independent defence layer that accomplishes or triggers the 
success of primary protection functions of assessed detection, delay and response. 
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